Cornell Law Library

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

Spring 2006

The Court's Purpose: Secular or Anti-strife?
Bernadette Meyler
Cornell Law School, bernadette-meyler@lawschool.cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Meyler, Bernadette, "The Court's Purpose: Secular or Anti-strife?" (2006). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 1374.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1374

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

CORNELL
LAW FORUM

SPRING 2006
What’s Wrong with Being
Creative and Aggressive?
Habeas Corpus and Enemy Combatants
The Court’s Purpose: Secular or Anti-strife?
Summer Law Institute in
Suzhou, China

CORNELL
LAW FORUM
A Note from the Dean ...........................................................................1
Stewart J. Schwab
What’s Wrong with Being Creative and Aggressive? ........................2
W. Bradley Wendel
All Three Branches: Institutional Process, Habeas Corpus,
and the Detention of Enemy Combatants...........................................8
Trevor W. Morrison
The Court’s Purpose: Secular or Anti-strife? ....................................14
Bernadette A. Meyler
News ....................................................................................................17
Judge Wesley ’74 Makes a Convincing Case for Clerking ................... 17
The Latest Developments in the War on Drugs.................................. 19
Law School Sponsors Summer Institute in Suzhou, China ................. 20
Labor Law Clinic ............................................................................... 21
Life on Death Row ............................................................................. 24
Alumni Co-founders of Hotels.com Visit Law School ........................ 25
Law School’s Exemplary Public Service Awards .................................. 28
Faculty Notes ......................................................................................35
Profiles.................................................................................................44
Professors Blume, Hockett, Meyler, Morrison, and Wendel................ 44
Tanya M. Douglas ’92 ........................................................................ 47
Joyce Pluta Haag ’75 .......................................................................... 48
Priscilla J. Forsyth ’06 ........................................................................ 49
David J. Miller ’06 ............................................................................. 50
Alumni ..................................................................................................52
Minter ’93 Wins Ford Foundation Award .......................................... 53
Toner ’92 Elected Chair of FEC ......................................................... 53
Class Notes ........................................................................................ 54
Cover: Gould Reading Room, Myron Taylor Hall

SPRING 2006
Vol. 32, No. 3

The Court’s Purpose:
Secular or Anti-strife?
Bernadette A. Meyler
Under the constitutional vision articulated last year in
the Supreme Court’s Ten Commandments decisions,
it seems that particular clauses of the Constitution
import within themselves a kind of emergency escape
clause, or interpretive direction, warning judicial users:
“Do not apply if overly divisive.” The majority in the
case involving exhibits of the Ten Commandments in
Kentucky courthouses, McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, applied a familiar standard in holding that the displays
violated the Establishment Clause. The plurality and
concurrence in the Texas case, Van Orden v. Perry,
although concluding that the statue commemorating
the Ten Commandments should remain standing on
the State Capitol grounds, refrained from adopting
any such orderly approach. Indeed, Justice Breyer’s
tie-breaking vote appears to have been primarily based
on the attempt to avoid the strife that removing a
monument reciting the Ten Commandments might
have occasioned.
Far from representing a radical exercise in judicial
“say-so,” as Justice Scalia would have it, the decision
that the courthouses of two counties in Kentucky
could not constitutionally persist in foregrounding
the Ten Commandments as part of a display on “The
Foundations of American Law and Government,”
demonstrated a rather traditional reliance upon the
Court’s established precedents. Justice Souter, writing
for the five-member majority, rigorously applied the
first prong of the three-part test derived from Lemon
v. Kurtzman, a 1971 case holding certain types of
state financial aid to religious schools unconstitutional.
From this, he concluded that the events leading up to
the counties’ presentation of the displays—including
several forerunner exhibitions and county legislative
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resolutions stating that the Ten Commandments are
“the precedent legal code upon which the civil and
criminal codes of . . . Kentucky are founded”—showed
that no predominantly secular purpose underlay the
courthouse exhibitions.
Nor are the substantive criticisms that the dissent
leveled at the deployment of this “secular purpose”
standard particularly persuasive. As the majority articulated it, the test bore substantial resemblance to those
in other segments of the Court’s jurisprudence—including equal protection and voting rights. Some of
the dissenters themselves have endorsed reconciling
the Court’s reasoning under the Religion Clauses with
approaches in similar areas of constitutional law, and
have been instrumental in generating those other approaches. In a 1993 decision about whether a town
had violated the free exercise rights of members of a
church practicing the Santeria religion, Justice Scalia
explained that “comparison with other fields supports,

rather than undermines, the conclusion we draw to- and Scalia, as well as Stevens and Ginsburg, scrutinized
day.” Comparison with these other fields also supports the legislative history to ascertain whether the measures
the understanding of “secular purpose” articulated by Congress had taken were congruent and proportional
with the attempt to remedy discrimination against
the majority in McCreary.
Inquiries into governmental and legislative purpose religious groups and practitioners.
It is, in addition, possible to reconcile the McCreary
form a standard component of constitutional decision-making, particularly in the race discrimination majority’s emphasis on secular governmental purpose
context, where the Court, in the 1976 case Washington with the outcome of the Texas capitol case. Whereas
v. Davis, announced that a particular official action the sequence of successive exhibits in Kentucky and
or law must both be motivated by a discriminatory the counties’ legislative resolutions about them clearly
purpose and result in a disparate racial impact to vio- evinced a predominantly sectarian purpose, the inlate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth stallation of the Ten Commandments monument in
Amendment. In considering race-based claims, the 1961 did not carry with it such evident markers of
Court has often looked to the particular series of events non-secular purpose. Furthermore, the Court has, in
leading up to the challenged decision in determining the past, held that the religious implications of certain
whether the government acted in accordance with kinds of historical artifacts or practices have become
a discriminatory purpose. Similarly, in McCreary, Justice Souter
exhaustively described the three The problem with the two Ten Commandments
successive Ten Commandments decisions is that the Court refrained from attempting
displays—each seemingly attempting to further mask the to bring them into accord.
non-secular purpose—as well
as the counties’ resolutions with
regard to them in reaching the
conclusion that the government’s purpose was not worn away over time, thus neutralizing any initially
sectarian motivations underlying them.
secular.
The problem with the two Ten Commandments
The majority also specified that the counties’ purpose needed to be “predominantly” secular, rather than decisions, however, is that the Court refrained from
simply motivated partly by religion and partly by other attempting to bring them into accord. Justice Breyer,
secular motives. Although Justice Scalia excoriated this who did not concur in the plurality’s opinion in Van
requirement as a new and unjustified invention, the Orden, but cast the deciding vote, reached his determilanguage of predominance is familiar from the racial nation through the exercise of “legal judgment” rather
gerrymandering arena. Likewise, the “searching review than invocation of the Court’s precedent. Although
of the [legislative] record” that the Court performed he explained that “the Texas display . . . might satisfy
to ascertain whether or not a secular purpose pre- this Court’s more formal Establishment Clause tests”
dominated echoed the reasoning undergirding a very (emphasis added), he did not rely on these tests, or on
different majority’s decision in 1997 in the City of the secular or non-secular purpose of those who erected
Boerne v. Flores. In that case, which invalidated certain the monument, but rather on “the basic purposes of the
provisions of the federal Religious Freedom Restora- First Amendment’s Religion Clauses themselves.”
The primary such purpose was, he opined, to
tion Act, the majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, avoid “religiously based divisiveness.” Because the
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Workers prepare to move the Ten Commandments
monument from public view at the judicial building
in Montgomery.

Congress reaffirming the religious language in the
Pledge of Allegiance. Neither the Constitution, nor
the Court’s interpretation of it, are incompatible with
the value that these religious practitioners place upon
monotheism. The Constitution simply assumes that
in America, a place where religious dissenters sought
refuge and where even the original state constitution of South Carolina specifically provided a way in
which fifteen men could together form a new sect, it
is unnecessary for government to impose a particular
vision of religion, or a particular version of the Ten
Commandments (which differ significantly among
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews), on everyone else.
Justice Scalia’s opinion, despite its majoritarian
emphasis, is far from avoiding divisiveness, but, perhaps, neither is Justice Breyer’s. When the Court, as
it did last fall, issues decisions that seem so inconsistent to the “reasonable observer”—the same one
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Ten Commandments monument on the lawn of the
Texas Capitol had been challenged only once in forty
years, he reasoned, “as a practical matter of degree this
display is unlikely to prove divisive.” By contrast, a Supreme Court decision to remove such a marker “might
well encourage disputes.” While some scholars have
noted that the Court’s judgments
rarely deviate substantially from
the norms of the contemporary The Constitution simply assumes that in America it
society, it is unusual to find opin- is unnecessary for government to impose a particular
ions actually stating as their bases
a desire to avoid constitutionally- vision of religion, or a particular version of the Ten
created conflict.
Commandments, on everyone else.
The vision articulated by Justice Breyer’s concurrence bears
within it dangers similar to those
entailed by Justice Scalia’s demagogic dissent in Mc- from whose vantage point the assessment of secular
Creary. Justice Scalia, in his most extreme judicial state- purpose occurs—it cannot help but cause consternament yet in favor of governmental religious expression, tion among people of all persuasions. This is even
significantly commenced his opinion by invoking the more the case when the Court eschews the attempt to
events of September 11, then continued by explain- apply enduring if evolving principles and substitutes
ing that, in his view, government should be able to for them “legal judgment,” however good or experiendorse a monotheistic God. It is perhaps not inci- enced that judgment might be. Whether or not the
dental that, in this rhetoric, the war on terror and the government’s purpose is secular, the Court’s seems to
culture wars are not here too far apart. The dissent is be anti-strife.
also firmly—almost shamelessly—majoritarian, insisting that 97% of Americans who believe in religion
are part of a monotheistic faith, and citing an Act of
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